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Abstract: 
This paper examines theoretically and empirically the extent to which the decision 
by foreign firms to invest in a group of countries is influenced by economic factors, 
as opposed to political risk and institutional performance. We consider the 
importance of these factors as drivers of foreign direct investment (FDI) for 32 
European countries (subsequently divided into three pooled clusters) by means of 
 panel regression techniques in two specifications over the 1995-2008 period. Our 
results suggest that risk and institutional factors considered in both static and 
dynamic perspectives significantly influence the behaviour of investors. Policies and 
institutions that vary widely between countries modify their decision-making, so 
that the purely economic factors have different statistical significance and impacts 
on the intensity of FDI, as was revealed by clustering countries into three groups 
according to levels of economic maturity. Additionally, not all factors of risk have 
an identical impact on FDI decisions in particular groups of countries. However, we 
find that as measures of political risk, monetary discipline, low regulation, effective 
government and good education prove to be highly significant for most country 
groupings. All of these measures reduce political risk and positively affect the level 
of FDI. 
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Highlights: 
 
• We compare 16 factors influencing FDI entry into three groups of countries. 
• Institutional and risk factors are important complements to economic factors. 
• The estimation is by static and dynamic specification of pooled panel data. 
• There is a high difference between static and dynamic decision-making of 
investors. 
• Importance of institutions rises with the degree of economic immaturity of 
recipients. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty and risk are inherent to economic environments, particularly those 
characterised by high capital mobility, world-wide financial shakeouts and the restructuring of 
international ties; (as in the case of the current crisis). Contemporary economics stresses the 
importance of institutions, as the “rules of the game” in a society guiding and reducing 
uncertainty and transaction costs in human interaction (Stiglitz, 1998). The real performance 
of economic institutions differs widely among countries; some may even become impediments 
to businesses. By adopting a cross-country comparative approach, the current paper 
empirically tests the extent to which decisions to invest in a given group of countries (as 
opposed to another group) are influenced by actual or perceived risk factors associated with 
investment ceteris paribus.  
This paper examines the risk associated with socio-political institutions and 
governance, which for the purpose of the current paper will be called “political risk”.1
Another qualification should also be considered: the recent boom in meta-analysis of 
economic research which reveals that economic theories are too often falsified by empirical 
data, or that the spectrum of empirical conclusions is so varied and conditional that their 
universal validity shrinks to particular cases. Such are the results of research on FDI spillovers 
by Wooster and Diebel (2010) and particularly by a series of recent papers by Havranek and 
Irsova (2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b), which imply that decision-making of investors is too 
 The key 
issue is to test how economic and political risk co-act in affecting foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows into a particular set of host countries. In the abundant literature regarding 
determinants of FDI, only a few studies include political risk as a relevant variable. Discussion 
of the relationship between risk and FDI tends to be embedded in the context of traditional 
FDI-macroeconomic drivers such as labour costs, factor endowments or level of infrastructure; 
in the present international context, these seem to be necessary but insufficient determining 
factors. Institutions are not linearly dependent complements to economic factors. Akerlof and 
Shiller (2009) doubt that real decision-making can be limited to economic rationality as 
approximated by mainstream economics. For example, there are psychological factors 
("animal spirits"), whose expectations reflect the institutional setup in a given society: its 
values, path-dependency or local conflicts of interest. In this regard, institutions can be 
dominant drivers of long-term development. 
                                                 
1 Political risk can be associated with exposure to losses due to man-made institutional constraints that 
discriminate among economic agents, striking a bias in the allocation of resources. Thus it is a factor that acts 
beyond traditional economics as an interference of political institutions (which may be informal or illicit) in 
market-based economies. Our paper tests how non-market factors related to policies, social governance, property 
rights, public goods and collective action modify decision-making of investors in various groups of countries. 
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complex to be captured by present economic theories. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that 
patterns of decision-making about investments depend to a large extent on political factors 
embodied in institutions; institutions, which were contrived locally and at widely varying 
levels of economic performance development.  
We consider 32 European countries, divided into three groups2
We focus primarily on behavioural patterns related to a priori perceptions regarding 
the relationship of risk and FDI, and on the revealed empirical evidence emerging from our 
estimates. As our results suggest, not all definitions of risk can be negatively associated with 
the FDI decision. Interestingly, this paper highlights both differences and similarities among 
countries that do not share the same history, culture and level of economic development 
(EBRD, 1994). Moreover, it reveals that non-economic factors are important but not easily 
predictable contributors to economic decision-making. 
 as follows: Advanced 
Europe, Accession countries (the first wave) and EU Candidate countries. By employing a 
cross-comparative approach, we seek to examine differences in the performance of 
conventional macro-economic factors as well as political/institutional risk factors affecting 
FDI decisions. Such a comprehensive discussion has been largely ignored in the context of 
cross-sectionally compared countries.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the 
determinants of FDI.  Section 3 explores the potential connection that may exist between 
political risk and FDI. Sections 4 and 5 focus on methodology and econometric modelling; and 
on results respectively. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2.  WHAT DETERMINES THE INFLOW OF FDI? 
 
The underlying reason for FDI is the entrepreneurial expectation of a higher yield of 
capital conceived as opportunity cost. However, this is directly unobservable soft data which 
by its very nature makes economic analysis very difficult. Thus there have been numerous 
attempts to find theoretical causes that correlate with entrepreneurial decisions. Beginning 
with Caves (1982), economists have concerned themselves with underlying reasons for the 
emergence of multinational corporations. Following the Ownership, Locational and 
Internationalization (OLI) paradigm developed by Dunning (1981), a plethora of literature 
attempts to model the empirically observable determinants of FDI. The vast majority of 
                                                 
2 Our groups are based on institutional similarities more than geography. Due to data limitations, we did not 
work with the EU-15 group, but created a group called Advanced Europe: 15 countries akin to the European 
Economic Area including Norway and Switzerland. The group of central and eastern European countries 
(CEECs) was split into nine Accession_1 countries (Malta had to be eliminated) and eight EU Candidate 
countries.   
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existing literature examines the influence of general economic phenomena, in spite of the 
inclusion of ‘political stability’ in the OLI framework. This is primarily due to the fact that 
economic phenomena are easily quantifiable (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). Since Dunning, 
other researchers have developed theoretical models to explain decisions regarding FDI. Such 
models have been broadly classified as ‘vertical firms’, ‘horizontal firms’ and ‘knowledge-
capital models’ (Markusen and Maskus, 1999a, 1999b).   
Much existing literature attributes FDI inflows to the following key factors: 
Labour costs – Many studies agree that abundant and cheap labour (relative to the investor 
country and to alternative locations) attracts FDI to a particular host economy. Using a panel 
dataset of bilateral flows of FDI from Western countries to CEECs, Bevan and Estrin (2004) 
find the coefficient on labour costs to be negative and significant. They report greater FDI 
flows to locations with relatively lower unit labour costs, independent of distance or host 
country size. This is compatible with the Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm of comparative 
advantage: specialization in labour-intensive production is intensified in countries with higher 
relative labour per capital endowments, which implies lower wages and higher capital yield.  
On the other hand, authors such as Lipsey (1999) indicated that labour costs might 
have a positive or indeed no significant influence. Thus there is no consensus on labour-
related coefficients, for these depend on type of investment, factor mix endowments, and level 
of development of the host country. The motivation of foreign investors depends on 
productivity levels of all factors rather than on absolute labour cost levels alone (Holland et al. 
2000). Rather than cheap and abundant labour, availability of innovation capability and of a 
highly skilled labour force could make economies attractive to FDI. For example, despite 
being a high cost economy, Sweden has attracted unprecedented levels of inward investment 
since joining the EU in 1995. According to Holland et al. (2000), factor costs play a secondary 
role to market access in terms of explaining inward FDI.   
Size of the market and potential of demand growth – As argued by Kobrin (1976), FDI 
is positively influenced by size (in terms of population or GDP) of the host economy market. 
Modern trade theories stress the importance of increasing returns to scale, which can be gained 
by capture of large external markets even at the cost of hiring expensive local labour. Bevan 
and Estrin (2004) find market size to be a very important determinant of FDI flows to CEECs 
Wells and Wint (2000) argue that GDP per capita, independent of market size, is a significant 
complementary explanatory variable of FDI. In summary, market size and growth potential are 
the major determinants of FDI in the CEECs (EBRD, 1994; Holland et al., 2000).  
Tax Issues and other Incentives – Although a macro-economic factor with a clear 
political underpinning, the ‘package’ of fiscal incentives on offer is also an important 
determinant of FDI. The package may include factors such as low level of corporation tax and 
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investment subsidies. In the case of Ireland, several commentators (e.g. Görg and Ruane, 
1999) have singled out low levels of corporate tax as the principal reason why Ireland has 
been successful in attracting FDI. Other support structures, which attract FDI, include good 
‘after-care’ service by industrial development agencies and good local physical infrastructure. 
For the CEECs, investment incentives have not had a significant impact on decisions to invest 
in the early stages of transition (Holland et al., 2000). However, this might be reversed in later 
stages. 
Openness – According to Jun and Singh (1996), export orientation of the host economy 
(as a measure of openness) can stimulate FDI. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) argue that 
international orientation is a good indicator of competitiveness and an important determinant 
with respect to FDI.  
Other less mentioned determinants – These include geographical distance (Bevan and 
Estrin, 2004); strategic links and networking effects (Nohuria and Garcia-Pont 1991); and 
‘diaspora’ effects, in particular duration and strength of diplomatic, cultural and economic ties 
between the home and potential host country. Greater ties increase understanding between 
home and host country, which is conducive to FDI (Slaughter, 2003; Barry, 2004).  Other 
factors identified in various studies have included economies of scale, management skills and 
innovative product technologies (Asiedu, 2002).  
 
3.  POLITICAL RISK AND FDI 
 
The literature since the late 1990s focuses increasingly on the notion of political risk. 
In particular, corruption as an indicator of political risk has gained prominence due to 
increased interaction (driven by globalization) between less corrupt and more corrupt 
countries. With the rising power of local bureaucracy and increasing opacity in public 
administration, the risk of state capture and political interventions can modify competition on 
already not-so-free markets. Increasing attention to political risks in socio-economic studies is 
associated with the revival of neo-institutional economics, brought to the fore by problems 
such as post-communist transition, globalization and world financial crises. 
We consider four studies essential to the methodology of this research. Alfaro et al.  
(2008, 2009) demonstrate why so many studies of FDI flows suffer from incomplete 
specification, omitting mainly the variables of human capital, market imperfections and 
institutional failure. Using data for 81 countries for 1979-2000 Alfaro et al. (2008) explain 
why poor countries keep constraining their access to capital. Aside from considering 
differences in economic fundamentals and capital market efficiency, poor countries fail mainly 
in the area of institutional quality relative to advanced countries. The paper concludes with a 
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challenge: ‘Recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of 
income, but remain silent on the specific mechanisms’ (p. 22).  
Secondly, Holland et al. (2000) reviewed available evidence on the relationship 
between FDI and factors affecting inflows. It is worth noting that political stability was only 
one of many contributory factors.  Their paper provides the following insights: first, political 
stability may influence the distribution of investment across countries; and second, location of 
investments may also be influenced by risk perceptions. Relying on survey and econometric 
evidence, Holland et al. report that macroeconomic and political stabilization policies have 
played an important role in the location of FDI. Their analysis considers a number of empirical 
works that relate to the CEECs. We extend the analysis by considering transition economies of 
two groups, comparing them with advanced countries over the time span 1995-2008 by 
applying more complex techniques of estimation.  
As a third paper, Guerin and Manzocchi (2009) combine economic factors of country 
size, per capita income and privatization proceeds with institutional variables proxying 
political regime; this  leads to a wide spectrum of inferences, including their conclusion about 
the two-channelled effect of democracy on FDI. Last but not least, we had to reconsider our 
general methodological approach following the quite recent paper by Jellema and Roland 
(2011) that deals with comprehensive questions how political, legal and cultural institutions 
could be related to growth. Their study draws attention to the fact that because this type of 
empirical testing lacks sufficient theoretical underpinning, it has problems with the choice of 
robust explanatory variables and gets easily entangled with multicollinearity and cointegration. 
Therefore we have limited our choice of institutional variables to fast-moving factors 
associated with political risk, which are also subject to economic policy-making. 
The current paper can be considered a follow-up to the above papers. First, we extend 
their scope by activating an interaction between soft institutional/risk factors and economic 
factors, assessing their balanced impacts. Second, we compare the importance of these factors 
in three groups of countries that differ as to level of economic development; and third, we 
apply two methods of panel estimation, each possessing a specific economic interpretation 
related to time and location. We consider the latter to be our most innovative contribution to 
quantitative analyses in the world context.   
In searching for a difinition of political risk, it was originally defined as adverse 
consequences arising from political events (Kobrin, 1979). Howell and Chaddick (1994) 
defined later political risk as ‘…the possibility that political decisions, events or conditions in 
a country, including those that might be referred to as social, will affect the business 
environment such that investors will lose money or have a reduced profit margin’ (p.71). In 
the 1990s, emerging discourse on the accountability of governments gave rise to a different 
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approach to defining political risk. Drabek and Payne (1999) use a ‘non-transparency’ 
variable; a composite indicator of corruption, unstable economic policies, weak property rights 
protection, and defective governance. In the same vein, Wei (2000) sees corruption as an 
important dimension of political risk, defining it as ‘…poor public governance rather than as 
bureaucratic corruption narrowly defined’ (p. 307). We could add such factors as corruption in 
the bureaucracy and the judicial system, red tape, and gaps in the rule of law. 
There are nearly as many definitions of political risk as there are studies on the issue. 
In his model of FDI determinants in the CEECs, Altomonte (2000) aims to reconcile various 
definitions used in the literature. With reference to the political risk attached to transient 
institutions in the CEECs, he uses two variables to measure: (1) the perceived quality of the 
local institutional framework (a ‘subjective index of transition’); and (2) the real extent of the 
legislative framework (an ‘objective index’). He finds the first variable to be highly 
significant, whereas the second variable is not. Nevertheless, all studies concur that political 
risk is seen to affect the value of FDI via changes in future cash flow and investors’ expected 
return.   
Corruption of bureaucratic mechanisms in a host country constitutes a special category 
of political risk. The classical theoretical work on corruption resides with Nye (1967) and 
Rose-Ackerman (1975). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) distinguished between organised/efficient 
corruption and disorganised/inefficient corruption. The former implies that payers can 
decrease transaction costs by means of a relatively well-defined bribe; with the latter, 
outcomes are uncertain even after a well-defined bribe. In defining corruption, the World 
Bank highlights the abuse of public power for private benefit (Tanzi, 1998). It can reasonably 
be stated that theoretical arguments against corruption have both ethical and economic 
aspects, such as inefficiencies of fettered markets or behaviour of agents trapped in the 
prisoner’s dilemma. Egger and Winner (2006) state that, ‘From a theoretical perspective, 
corruption may act as either a grabbing hand or a helping hand for inward FDI…’ (p. 459).   
Having discussed relevant dimensions of political risk, we examine twelve aspects of 
political/institutional risk as determinants of FDI in the environment of developed European 
countries, CEECs, and other transition economies. We look at behavioural differences in 
markets for FDI between countries, and institutional factors that explain such differences. 
Empirically testing political risk as an explanatory variable of FDI is not an easy task. 
Evidence can be broadly divided into survey versus econometric estimation. In the literature in 
general, results of econometric studies are mixed. Harms (2002) aptly sums up the situation: 
‘While survey studies regularly show that political risk plays an important role in managers’ 
decisions whether to invest in a particular country, the econometric evidence on political risk 
and investment flows is much less conclusive’ (p. 377).  
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Busse and Hefeker (2007) empirically estimate the links between a variety of 
components of political risk, institutional quality and FDI flows, finding a great many of them 
significant. Drabek and Payne (1999) report a negative impact of non-transparency on FDI. 
Looking at the case of 35 developed and emerging countries in the year 2000, Hooper and 
Kim (2007) used an ‘opacity index’ and found that higher opacity deters capital inflows, in 
particular FDI. Breuss, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2010) confirmed by using logistic regressions, 
that entry to the EU and access to structural and cohesion funds increased the attractiveness of 
new EU members as FDI recipients; this can be interpreted as an institutional arrangement 
that decreases the risk in these countries.  
On the other hand, using panel data for 15 Latin American economies (1980-1996), 
Biglaiser and De Rouen (2006) found that the only covariates strongly correlated with the rate 
of FDI in a given year were the risk of expropriation, domestic financial and trade reform, 
high government consumption in host countries, and reinvestment by MNCs. Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) fail to find a significant correlation between size of FDI and the host country’s 
composite risk measure, which includes perception of corruption as one dimension. In a 
pooled analysis of developing countries over the period 1982-1995, Li and Resnick (2003) 
fail to find any statistically significant effect of political stability improvements on FDI 
inflows, with the exception of regime durability. Globerman and Shapiro (2003), in a two-
stage analysis of US FDI flows to 43 countries (1994-1997), find that an index of political 
instability and violence (comprising armed conflict, social unrest and terrorist threats) does 
not influence the probability of a country’s receiving FDI inflow, but does reduce the amount 
of FDI inflow.  
Some conflicting results on the relationship between political risk and FDI can be 
resolved by considering type of FDI (or entry mode) chosen by the firm, this is rarely 
discussed in the literature. In his study of Swedish investors entering new markets, Zejan 
(1980) claimed that increased risk in the 1970s led to a positive influence on the propensity to 
choose takeovers (as a low risk strategy) rather than green field investment as an entry mode. 
Therefore, information on ownership and control is essential in the exploration of political 
risk as a factor influencing FDI (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Bassino, 2006). The results of 
the econometric studies, although mixed, point towards a positive impact of what could be 
termed ‘a sound political framework’ on inward FDI, irrespective of the definition of risk 
used.  
Survey studies (via interviews or questionnaires) indicate that perceived political risk 
and stability are important considerations in determining FDI (Bass, McGregor and Walters 
1997). However, in a survey of German FDI in the CEECs, Wei, Andreosso-O’Callaghan and 
von Wuntsch (2007) conclude that political instability ranks fourth among determinants of 
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FDI, and is very much overshadowed by market access and tax considerations. The 
importance of the latter was also stressed by Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002).  
The studies mentioned above lead to three major conclusions. First, political risk has 
not been systematically included in studies on determinants of FDI. Second, where it has been 
included, results on its impact are mixed, absent to a wider institutional context for such 
findings. Third, the method of analysis is not neutral to results: the choice of analytical 
technique combined with an indiscriminate approach to cross-section and time-series 
specifications can result in incompatible economic conclusions. Regarding transition 
countries in Europe, the evidence is clearer. Because CEECs have experienced drastic change 
in political regimes since the fall of the Berlin wall, most studies on FDI determinants in 
CEECs include a proxy for the political risk variable. All survey studies on these economies 
convey similar results: political risk is a hindrance to FDI. In particular, using EBRD 
transition indicators, Lankes and Venables (1997) argue that risk increases the likelihood of 
FDI projects’ being abandoned.  
These results have been substantiated by the econometric work of Holland and Pain 
(1998); Bevan and Estrin (2004); Frankel, Funke and Stadtmann (2004). In the latter study, 
risk has political as well as economic aspects, and is found to significantly affect FDI in the 
case of CEECs during the time period 1992-2000. Given the current papers’ focus on 
European economies and in particular CEECs, Bevan and Estrin’s (2004) insights are 
particularly relevant.  Employing a panel dataset (1994-2000) of bilateral flows of FDI from 
Western economies to CEECs, they find the primary influences of FDI to be unit labour costs, 
gravity factors, market size and proximity. They report that announcements about timetables 
for admission to the EU increase levels of FDI to prospective members and diminish the 
importance of country risk. Would this imply that the EU accession is bound to wane the 
importance of risk in these economies – pointing to a sort of institutional convergence?  
From the previous analysis, another two important observations can be inferred. First, 
definitions of political risk have followed a chronological evolution. Earlier studies (through 
the early 1990s) defined political risk as referring to the occurrence of political events such as 
abrupt regime change (coups d’état), conflict, political and social disruptions. In contrast, 
more recent studies emphasize highly heterogeneous sovereign national policies and 
institutions and their varying impacts on attracting FDI. This conceptual shift aligns with 
deepening globalization, in particular the breakdown of the Soviet Union with its concomitant 
phenomenon of ‘transition economies’, as well as the relative success of economic reforms in 
China and its economic rapprochement with both the USA and the EU. With the decrease of 
perceived political risk (e.g., seizure of assets by a centralised system) and political 
uncertainty (with former USSR ‘satellite’ and neighbouring countries being free to adopt pro-
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market principles), the definition of political risk has shifted to embrace ‘good governance’ 
issues – a notion that appeared in the 1990s under the influence of neo-institutional 
economics.  
Second, policies and their real implementation in CEECs often interfered with market 
functions; the intensity of this inference varied in time. Pro-liberal reforms prior to EU 
accession often received a setback once the umbrella of acquis communautaire could be used 
for reverting to practices of governance found in command economies. This chronological 
and conceptual shift in institutions, from pro-market to bureaucratic, needs to be taken into 
account when defining political risk in post-communist countries. It should be incorporated in 
our time-series. 
 
4.  METHODOLOGY AND MODEL VARIABLES EMPLOYED IN THIS STUDY 
 
We use a panel regression technique that allows us to pool together significant clusters 
of data in a systematic framework so as to analyze the relationship between FDI drivers and 
FDI flows in countries sharing a certain institutional history. Our approach distinguishes 
between cross sectional and time series dimensions of the processes reflected in our data. 
Most of the studies cited in our paper employ a panel data regression to examine the causality 
relationship between FDI determinants and the observed investment flows in the countries of 
interest. It is common to estimate such a relationship by models with fixed or random effects. 
We have also tested the data for autoregressive processes in the variables, which allows us to 
complement the previous static estimation with a dynamic model of GMM. The usage of 
instrumental variables improves the consistency of estimators because it is more resistant to 
endogeneity and co-integration among our explanatory variables. 
Without pretending that this kind of analysis could unveil true causal linkages, our aim 
is to explain the general regularities that could potentially be correlated with FDI annual 
inflows in groups of selected European countries in the period 1995-2008, i.e. prior the world 
financial crisis. The FDI data under investigation are expressed in US dollars and were 
obtained from the UNCTAD online database of 2010. In line with the variables identified in 
the literature, the traditional macroeconomic determinants of FDI include:  
GDP per capita (PPP), as a variable that measures the “wealth” effect that attracts FDI;  
Population size, as a measure of market size. A priori one would expect that a sufficiently 
large market size would serve as an attractive factor for investors seeking a higher demand for 
their products; 
Trade openness (as a ratio of trade turnover per GDP), quantifying the potential for enlarging 
the domestic market by exporting or purchasing inputs abroad; 
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Telecommunication infrastructure proxy (number of telephones per 1000 of population). 
Countries with a developed telecommunication infrastructure would be more attractive;  
Labour cost (as an index of growth in labour compensation, with an index of 100 in base-
year 2000) meant as a proxy for employment costs behind the value added. We aim to 
measure whether higher costs of labour are an impediment to FDI efficiency. 
We have extended the former list by considering eleven potential political risk 
indicators in order to assess how economic factors of FDI are complemented by institutional 
and political risk factors3
Business (regulation) freedom:  the ability to create, operate, and close an enterprise quickly 
and easily. Burdensome, redundant regulatory rules are seen as the most harmful barriers to 
business efficiency.  
:  
Trade freedom:  a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that 
affect imports and exports of goods and services.  
Monetary freedom: combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price 
controls. Both inflation and price controls distort market activity.  
Freedom from government:  a score based on the level of all government expenditures – 
including consumption and transfers – and state-owned enterprises. Ideally, the state will 
provide only true public goods, without lavish public expenditure. Hence, countries with 
heavy government spending are assigned the lowest scores. 
Fiscal freedom: a measure of the burden of government from the revenue side. It includes 
both the tax burden in terms of the top tax rate on income (individual and corporate 
separately) and the overall amount of tax revenue as portion of GDP.  
Property rights: an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, 
secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state.  
Investment freedom: an assessment of the free flow of capital, especially foreign capital.  
Financial freedom:  a measure of banking security as well as independence from government 
control. State ownership of banks and other financial institutions such as insurer and capital 
markets is an inefficient burden, and political favoritism has no place in a free capital market.  
Freedom from corruption:  based on quantitative data that assess the perception of 
corruption in the business environment, including levels of governmental legal, judicial, and 
administrative corruption. 
                                                 
3 The first nine indicators are taken from the Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom, thus retaining 
their names.  We have opted to use these instead of World Bank governance indicators because the former 
demonstrate better coverage for the years 1995-2008 and offer a wider span of indicators that relate to 
institutional barriers to market performance. To our knowledge, these indices have not yet been used in the 
context of FDI, risk and policy-making. Our aim was to use institutional/risk variables as policy instruments, in 
contrast to economic variables that lack this property.  
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Education index: reflecting the endowments of human capital.  Its level is strongly 
influenced by public administration. 
Government effectiveness:  considered to be the proxy for the organization of public 
governance and its positive externalities. 
The use of ordinal scale in measurement has become quite common recently in 
academic studies where researchers seek to quantify qualitative phenomena that differ in 
ranking (Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz (2006); Wei (2005)). It should be highlighted that in 
our case these indicators are perception-based and accepting their potential subjective bias is a 
risk undertaken by the researchers. The available alternatives are scarce and can be 
summarised as follows: dropping institutional variables means an omission specification bias 
due to increased endogeneity. Each of our eleven variables represents a score between 1 and 
100, for a particular country and for a specific year. The higher the score, the more freedom 
(or positive performance) a country experiences within a particular category. In line with our 
previous discussion, it can be argued that each of the risk variables outlined above can be 
viewed as part of a broad political risk component. We nevertheless treat these different 
components as stand-alone determining variables in a standard FDI equation, which also 
includes five macroeconomic variables as explained above. A summary of the explanatory 
variables used and their data sources are provided in Table 1.   
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Table 1:  The list of macroeconomic, institutional and risk (exogenous) variables  
Macroeconomic variables: Sources: 
* GDP per capita in PPP [GDP/PC], 
* Population size [POPUL],  
* Trade openness [TRADE/GDP],  
* Telecommunication infrastructure [TELEC],  
* Labour cost [L-COST]  
* The World Bank, external data 
statistics on GDP, population and 
trade, 2010;                                                              
* United Nations, Statistics on 
labour and earnings, 2010;                                                                  
* IMF, WEO Database, 2010 
Institutional and risk variables: Sources: 
* Business freedom (regulation) index [REGUL],  
* Trade freedom (trade barriers) index [TRADE],  
* Monetary freedom (inflation and price control) index   
[MONET],  
* Freedom from government (public spending) index 
[GOVERN],  
* Fiscal freedom (taxation) index [FISCAL],  
* Property rights index [PROP-R],  
* Investment freedom (capital controls) index [INVEST],  
* Financial freedom (private banking security) index 
[FINANC],  
* Freedom from corruption (perception) index 
[CORRUPT]. 
* The Heritage Foundation, 
Database on the Economic 
Freedoms, 2010. 
* Education Index [EDUC].  * United Nations, Human Development Index, 2010. 
* Government Effectiveness [GVT-EFF]. * The World Bank, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009. 
 
 
After testing the statistical properties of our exogenous variables (e.g. their co-linearity 
or significance in regressions), we have selectively limited the analysis to a final set of those 
explanatory variables that were statistically relevant for explaining FDI in a given group. 
Thus by econometric testing we have arrived at a list of key factors necessary for inclusion, 
with the objective of arriving at a robust measure of both economic factors of FDI as well as 
their associated political risk.  
The 32 countries used in this study were tested for common properties in four different 
groups: ALL (a category defined to include all 32 countries), Advanced European-15 (i.e. the 
13 economically advanced EU incumbent countries, plus Switzerland and Norway), 
Accession-9 (i.e. those countries that joined the EU in May 2004, except Malta), and the EU 
Candidate-8 countries (i.e. the candidates as of 2005, including Bulgaria and Romania). A list 
of the countries is provided in Table 2 below. The analysis was performed on 14 years of data 
covering the time span 1995-2008. 
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Table 2:  List of countries used for this study with breakdown into groups 
Groups Countries 
Group 1 (ALL) Advanced Europe-15 + Accession-9 + EU Candidates-8 
Group 2 (Advanced Europe-15) 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Group 3 (Accession-9) Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
Group 4 (EU Candidates-8) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Turkey 
 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
The panel data regressions were estimated as logarithmic data on the four groups of 
countries identified above. The assignment to groups was undertaken with a view to historical 
paths related to EU institutional alignment, assuming that members of such groups were 
subject to some institutional similarities formed by compliance with acquis communautaire or 
the degree of development. 
Our first concern before proceeding with regressions was to assess the extent of 
potential multicollinearity between independent variables. Both the correlation matrices and 
VIF statistics indicate that there is one common drawback in our data: in all our groups GDP 
per capita (i.e. level of economic development) is too closely co-integrated with some of the 
remaining economic variables (such as infrastructure or labour costs) and institutional 
variables (such as education or corruption), though not in a uniform fashion across groups. 
The VIF statistics reveal that GDP per capita can be highly significantly "explained" by the 
remaining variables in all four groups, pointing to endogeneity in explanatory variables 
generated by implicit causal links between them. It is an interesting finding implying that 
economic underdevelopment is reflected in institutional underdevelopment (and vice versa). 
The interaction between economics and institutions, as a sort of circular causality is a form of 
endogeneity of development in the real world.  
In light of the above, we had no better option than to drop the GDP per capita from the 
cross-section specifications of our model, thus offering an increased visibility to other 
variables (as its allied instruments), which would otherwise be crowded-out from 
regressions.4
                                                 
4 Although dropping a collinear variable that is theoretically autonomous solves the technical data problem, it 
has its drawbacks: it introduces a specification error into the equation and lowers the explanatory power of our 
findings. The latter use of instrumental variables is a partial solution to that issue. 
 The initial co-integration in our data was so great that even after dropping GDP 
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per capita, we could presume that this variable was implicitly present by means of its 
functionally allied "manifest" variables. Alternatively, by keeping GDP per capita in the 
model we could construct a parallel specification (autonomous for each group), that would be 
theoretically justified. In cases of time-series specification the option of including the GDP 
per capita was vindicated by the higher explanatory power of that regression. In order to avoid 
ambiguity and inflation of results we kept only one specification for each type of estimation.  
The next step was the estimation of our four models (for all, advanced, accession and 
candidate countries) by means of fixed versus random effects. Panel data can be identified as 
a problem to be solved by either cross-section or time-series analysis; this reflects the problem 
faced by investors as decision-makers. Financial investors assess the opportunity costs of their 
investment in various alternative allocations (in this case by country), ranking their odds in 
each of them in a static (geographic) way related to accumulated past information. The latter 
points to panel estimation as a series of cross-section segments, as depicted in Fig. 1. Each 
parallel solid line starting from A1Z1 up to AtZt represents cross-section observations of FDI 
by country A through Z in given time T=1, 2, ... t relative to market size proxied by 
population size. Our model estimates parameter β that quantifies FDI absorption among 
countries at different sizes of their markets in a given time. It is a static description of 
outcomes of past decisions. 
 
  FDI 
  inflows 
  in EUR    
                         Zt 
 
          At 
       
  
 
               Z1 
     
                       
                     
                    
          Market size (population) 
 
A1                B1 
         β     cross-section view for time T=1 
 τ      time-series view for country Z A3 
A2 I3 
I1
 
I2 
Bt Zt-1 
 
 
Z2 
Fig. 1: Estimation of the panel data by cross-section specification versus by time-series 
specification. 
 
However, every experienced investor would claim that this must be combined with 
"dynamics", that is,  with the evolution over time of the situation in countries, because what 
ultimately matters are future (expected) yields and the dynamics of market size. The latter 
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points to a panel estimation as time-series and the general dependence of FDI on the 
evolution of market size in individual countries over time. Under such circumstances, we 
work with data arranged by dashed lines A1At through Z1Zt and estimate parameter τ that 
characterizes the growth of FDI as separate markets grow in time. This is crucial information 
for the real decision-making process. By using parallel static and dynamic estimation we can 
reflect the two-stage decision making of investors who first decide where to locate their FDI 
and then how much to invest.  
From a technical point of view, this theoretically well-known complementary dual 
estimation of panel data5
In our estimations we have proceeded gradually, first testing the panel in a cross-
section specification by means of both fixed and random effects, and subsequently estimating 
it in a time-series specification. The choice between fixed and random effects estimators was 
based on the Hausman specification test. However, the estimators by these methods may not 
be free from bias caused by potential endogeneity between our indicators and FDI (pointing to 
 offers a unique explanatory insight, even though empirical 
researchers have seldom considered it explicitly. As we can see, both estimates are necessary 
because they provide different complementary information about the state of FDI flows in 
given countries. Quite rarely are coefficients β and τ identical, pointing to unchanging 
proportionality of FDI to market size among countries and in time. For example, if β=0,8 then 
opening up market B1 (which is by 100% larger than A1) will attract FDI in I2, which is larger 
by 80% than I1 in market A1 (due merely to the size factor). However, if the market size of A1 
expands in the next period by 50% to A2 then its FDI can be expected to increase to I3, 
implying that it reacts at a higher intensity because its coefficient τ = 1,6. The observation that 
β < τ implies that we, as external observers, have a dual vision on the impact of market size on 
FDI: we can see that investors were responding more intensively (in the observed time 
period) to the perspective of growing markets than to situations where they considered 
opportunities by discriminating among countries with different market sizes in a given year. A 
statistically significant difference in coefficients β and τ signals that a break occurred in the 
past trends in the relationship between related two indicators. In addition, as our estimations 
will show, pattern of time versus geography-dependent responses differs not only between 
countries (or the groups of countries) but also in time.  
                                                 
5 Baltagi (2008) explains the dual nature of panel data in the analysis by two-way in contrast to one-way error 
component models (pp. 57-63). By pooling our panel separately across countries and over time we could then 
derive two parallel one-way models based on identical identifications but describing different aspects of 
investment strategies,  i.e. to groups pooled either by trade-offs in space (static cross-section) or by different time 
trajectories (dynamic time-series). 
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a hidden loop of reversed causality), or when the correlation of some regressors with error 
terms would be caused by omitted variables or the existence of measurement errors. All our 
estimates were cross-checked by estimations with instrumental variables, for which we used 
the dynamic one-step GMM estimation. The results for the estimation of macroeconomic, 
institutional and risk drivers of FDI in all 32 countries of our panel are presented in Table 3 
(see Appendix 1).6
 The static cross-section type of estimation with fixed effects (marked as #1a) reveals 
that three economic indicators are dominant in decisions by investors about the choice of 
country for their ventures: market size, infrastructure and labour costs. However, risk 
indicators are no mere fringe factors – they act as a concomitant institutional underpinning of 
the former (as well as being the policy instruments). The general importance of efficiency of 
financial intermediation and education is apparent. Surprisingly, high government spending 
(i.e. a low index of "government freedom"), seems to act as an important attractor of FDI and 
not as a barrier; this was also the case with high labour costs. In addition, we included in 
Table 3 an alternative specification marked as #1b where the variable GDP per capita was 
also included. This required the elimination of its collinear variables of telecommunications, 
labour costs and some institutional risks. The latter model is simpler, crowding out two of the 
previously significant institutional variables.  
  
The GMM estimator of a similar model (#2, parallel to #1a), but viewed from an IV 
perspective, points again to the crucial importance of economic factors. However, its 
assessment of institutional circumstances indicates that there could be other risk factors to 
consider (bearing in mind that the coefficients of the GMM estimation can be viewed as 
elasticities).   
The complementary model of decision-makers estimated as a panel succession of 
time-series of 32 countries (see #3) had to be approached by a GLS regression with random 
effects. Here we decided to include GDP per capita due to its robustness at the expense of 
dropping some of its collinear risk factors. The decisions of investors within time evolution 
seem to concentrate predominantly on the growth of economic factors, complemented by 
                                                 
6 All our estimators were tested for multicollinearity, which was eliminated in the final specifications. In cases of 
the presence of heteroscedasticity, White´s corrections for the residual variance were applied. All our 
alternatively estimated coefficients are comparable – we can treat them akin to elasticities. While working with 
the GMM, we checked that its instruments did not over-identify the model and guaranteed their exogeneity 
especially in estimations with low number of countries. We first relied on Sargan and Hansen tests, whose p-
values were greater then 5%. We complemented these by two Arellano-Bond tests of AR(1) and AR(2), where 
the former should indicate values below and the latter above 5%. In the choice of instruments we relied on high 
differences derived from sufficiently large lags, which our data provided with ease; the number of instruments 
was not greater than the number of countries. 
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rising government expenditures. The differences in coefficients of the economic variables 
highlighted above (compared to cross-section estimation #1a) are not very high. However, 
there is one crucial difference if compared with #1b: the coefficient for GDP per capita of 
0,778 is now lower than 1,472 estimated cross-sectionally. This can be interpreted as a 
tendency in the observed 14 years towards a FDI bias in favour of rich countries, 
notwithstanding the catching up of poorer countries. It needs to be borne in mind that cross-
country (static or country trade-off) and cross-time (dynamic or FDI growth) considerations 
of investors are not exclusive; rather, they are parallel complementary decision-making 
processes.  
A parallel IV estimation was run by means of GMM technique; we searched for 
common patterns of behaviour for 32 countries over time. We found that the dominant 
variable for FDI dynamics was the market size (proxied by population). This factor crowded 
out GDP per capita, telecommunication infrastructure and labour costs, which became 
statistically insignificant. This model's results are the simplest of all our estimations, with the 
model possessing a rather surprising implication: the institutional situation in destination 
countries of FDI within Europe does not seem to be crucially important to investors from a 
dynamic long-run perspective. They considered it relevant only from a momentary (cross-
sectional) point of view when their decision-making discriminated among countries on 
grounds of institutions and political risks. Once such a discrimination as to FDI allocation was 
made, FDI could grow regardless of institutions and evolve at a more uniform rate among 
countries. 
One of our objectives was to test whether behavioural and institutional conditions for 
FDI allocation across countries were homogenous and invariant in time. Thus we clustered 
the data according to EU membership history, which is related to the economic and 
institutional maturity of countries. Table 4 depicts the estimators characteristic of European 
advanced countries, the majority of them being EU incumbents. The tests show an essential 
difference in the revealed decisions of investors in this group of countries.  
It is worth noting that the desegregation of the initial set of 32 countries into three 
subgroups varies the hypotheses tested: the aspect of feasible investment alternatives is 
constrained by the list of countries in the group. It is assumed that investors have already 
decided about investing into a particular subgroup of countries (subject to analyses #1 through 
#4); the problem is to choose the "correct" country from the short-listed ones. Thus we follow 
the step-wise decision-making of investors who optimize their FDI allocation by comparing 
opportunity costs by eliminating countries from an originally much wider set. Our estimates 
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for four different groups of countries have to be taken as complementary instruments for 
deciding about competing locations of an investment venture. We start by separating the 
group of 15 advanced European countries (see Table 4 in Appendix 1).  
The first apparent change in behaviour of investors to advanced countries is that in 
models #5 and #6 the dependence of FDI on both economic and risk factors is weaker, as 
testified by the lower coefficient of determination and lower significance of coefficients in all 
regressions. The finding of negative dependence of FDI on property rights in  cross-country 
regression #5 with random effects (but not confirmed in the GMM model) could be explained 
by the consideration that law enforcement in all these countries is still generally high, when 
compared with the rest of Europe. A high negative coefficient of investment freedom in the 
GMM estimation shows that investing into rich European countries was not discouraged by 
capital controls (present up to the early 1990s in countries such as Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal). The panel time-series specification and the GMM estimation for our 15 advanced 
countries in #7 and #8 point to a very similar outcome. Indeed, FDI decisions to enter these 
countries seem to reflect preferences as to two dominant economic factors: market size and 
trade openness. The tendency to risk neutrality is explicit (as risk differentials might be 
considered low and unimportant).   
Table 5 with estimates for nine EU first wave accession countries offers a different 
picture. Even though market size proxied by population in models #9 and #10 is again a 
decisive economic factor,  numerous institutional/risk factors emerge. Prudent regulatory, 
monetary and fiscal policies, in addition to government effectiveness are important attractors 
of FDI in these countries. Apart from market size, all significant variables deal with policies. 
The message from this can be formulated as a maxim: successful transition and prosperity 
(i.e. GDP per capita that is highly collinear with our exogenous variables) rests on attracting 
FDI by fine-tuning the institutional setup in a country. 7
In the case of the panel time-series estimation in models #11 and #12, it is worth 
noting that heavy government interventions and spending (e.g. high government 
procurement), schemes for FDI promotion (related to the variable GOVERN) and perhaps 
even capital controls, acted (contrary to intuition) as factors which boosted FDI inflows.  
 
Even more institutionally-driven developments in FDI were found in the estimates for 
eight candidate countries as shown in Table 6. The cross-section specification of the panel in 
                                                 
7 We have also experimented with an alternative specification where GDP per capita was included, which 
required the removal of several collinear institutional variables. Such a specification pointed to the essential 
importance of labour costs with a positive sign.  
 19 
#13 and #14 reveals the importance of trade openness and regulatory and monetary discipline. 
Effectiveness of governments and education, plus higher labour costs are positively associated 
with FDI. On the other hand, fiscal, investment and corruption burdens do not impede FDI. 
The panel time-series estimations in #15 and #16 concur with the previous findings: FDI 
growth is motivated essentially by market size, de-regulation, education and government 
effectiveness. Encroachments on property rights and investment activities are correlated with 
FDI absorption.  
One important finding emerges when we compare results for the three groups of 
countries that are related to economic maturity: high GDP per capita and advanced 
institutional setup are inversely related to the number of factors relevant for explaining FDI. 
At the same time, FDI inflows behave in a less deterministic way in developed countries. The 
highest level of explained FDI variations was estimated among the less developed candidate 
countries. The relevance of institutional and risk factors was the most important among them. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research is based on a comparative approach focused on FDI coming to selected 
groups of European countries (including accession and EU candidate countries). The novelty 
of our analysis consists mainly in the formulation of an FDI function adopted in this research, 
which blends five macroeconomic factors with a wide range of political, governance and 
institutional risk indicators, and the parallel estimates of behavioural patterns of investors in 
three subgroups of countries. The study finds that behavioural patterns in deciding to invest 
abroad differ among European recipients of FDI, depending on their economic and 
institutional maturity.  
The results estimated across four different groups of countries substantiate the 
voluminous literature on FDI modelling available to date. As we attempted to formulate FDI 
as a function of combined risk indicators and traditionally accepted macroeconomic drivers, 
the focus was shifted into the area of investors’ perceptions – particularly the perceptions of 
phenomena with policy connotations. Thus, the results summarised in Tables 3 through 6 
elaborate on the frequently observable dichotomy between investors’ actions and their 
perceptions. In particular, these results provide an alternative examination of the role of risk 
and policy factors in FDI decisions. 
The distinction between the static (cross-country) and dynamic (time-dependent) 
views on decision making of investors is another innovative aspect of our analysis. The results 
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of cross-section panel estimations (where countries compete for FDI) and time-series panel 
estimations (where investors decide about the growth of FDI) are complementary, reflecting 
the multi-criterial approaches in investors’ decision-making, thereby enriching the 
explanatory power of our analysis. In general, the regression outputs exhibit significant 
behavioural differences between countries grouped by their history in alignment with the EU. 
We find that countries under different institutions and diverse economic development differ 
quite consistently with regard to drivers of FDI attraction and absorption. Visible differences 
also appear in the statistical significances and even signs of factors across groups. Given that 
the heterogeneity of behaviour at national level is so pronounced, we cannot rely on the 
existence of some all-embracing general macroeconomic theory covering FDI allocation.  
The most striking differences, in terms of determining factors and statistical 
significance of risk indicators, can be found in comparing the advanced Europe-15 with the 
remaining 17 countries. We have observed that FDI coming to highly-developed countries, 
with a history of long economic integration and shared institutional setup, is much less 
sensitive to political risk factors than FDI to destination countries that are poorer and 
institutionally heterogeneous. Lack of transparency in these countries calls for caution or even 
discrimination by investors, though it is not a foregone conclusion that better performing 
institutions automatically attract more investment or suppress caution in investors. In cases 
where the institutional setup contradicts liberal tenets, such as high taxation and government 
spending, investment controls or corruption were associated with higher FDI. This tendency 
was more apparent in economically and institutionally less advanced countries. 
All our regressions illustrate the importance of market size, proxied by population 
size, as a crucial and omnipresent factor of FDI attraction, followed in importance by trade 
openness. The remaining economic and institutional factors either enhance or diminish their 
importance. The variable of trade openness was so robust that the parallel institutional 
variable of trade freedom was found to be statistically significant in only one case. 
Interestingly, whenever labour costs were statistically significant, their sign was positive. The 
bias of FDI to seek cheap labour, typical for comparative advantages in post-communist 
countries in the early 1990s seems to have lost its importance in the latter period.  
With regard to political risk, there was a consistent positive and significant 
relationship between FDI inflows and price stability, absence of price controls and high 
inflation (i.e. the ‘monetary freedom indicator’), low regulation, effective government and 
good education. This indicates that countries with more transparent and efficient institutions 
tend to experience higher levels of FDI and prosperity. There is broadly established consensus 
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as to the fact that institutional failures in these areas tend to disrupt market efficiency; more 
importantly such ill-performing policies negatively affect investors’ expectations.  
Contrary to intuition, we find that factors such as high government taxation and 
spending, capital controls or inefficient local banking do not seem to be universal 
impediments to FDI. Here our findings are at odds with the survey results reviewed earlier in 
the paper.  Paradoxically, in some cases even corruption and low levels of property rights 
protection did not hinder FDI. Such an outcome could reasonably be attributed to the fact that 
investors price their investments in the country on the basis of political risk according to the 
level of stability in the long-run. Thus, for example, investors might be willing to “tolerate” 
an excessive level of corruption or taxation if it does not affect their market power in the 
country, allowing investors also to receive rents from their good contacts with the local 
political powers. Such an outcome could also be attributed to the ongoing globalization 
process and its spur given to capital mobility. 
This study points to an important aspect of development, which is associated with 
transiency of principles and factors that determine decision-making of international direct 
investors, which we have attempted to measure. The transiency is related not only to time but 
also to the changing perceptions of investment opportunities in space (i.e. across countries in 
given time). This brings to the focus investors' expectations of risks and potential losses from 
transaction costs in alternative ventures. A large part of the perceived risk factor is related to 
the institutional setup in host countries that is subject to national economic policies.  
The countries analyzed in this research are at varying stages of economic and 
institutional (under)development, which was reflected also by their groupings. Their evolving 
position relative to the EU core, however, allows them to switch in time from one group to 
another – as happened in the case of many of the accession countries in 2004. From the 
obtained results, we argue that institutions, social governance and political risk are 
undisputable factors in FDI determination, complementing the economic conditions of 
investment yields. Even though the former are measured via soft data, we are of the view that 
models omitting this aspect of FDI would not only be miss-specified and subject to higher 
estimation bias, but also fail to acknowledge the rich policy-dependence of FDI inflows.  
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Appendix 1: Tables 3-6 with coefficients and econometric characteristics  
TABLE 3: Macroeconomic, institutional and risk drivers of FDI – All-32 
  #1a #1b #2 #3 #4 
Indicators  
(in logs) 
Cross-section 
specification 
Cross-section 
specification 
Cross-section 
specification 
Time-series 
specification 
Time-series 
specification 
  Fixed    effects Random effects Dynamic GMM Random effects Dynamic GMM 
(Intercept) -8,409 ** -4,188 *** -0,341 -1,72 -119,7 
  [0,01] [0,00] [0,95] [0,31] [0,20] 
GDP/PC   1,472 ***  0,778 ** 1,306 
    [0,00]  [0,03] [0,54] 
POPUL 0,949 *** 0,847 *** 1,907 *** 0,789 *** 3,614 ** 
  [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,04] 
TRADE/GDP 0,152   2,538 **     
  [0,57]   [0,04]     
TELEC 0,636 ***   0,002 0,550 ** -0,162 
  [0,00]   [0,99] [0,02] [0,91] 
L-COST 0,573 ***   0,810 *** 0,482 *** -0,599 
  [0,00]   [0,00] [0,00] [0,60] 
REGUL 0,667   1,886  5,223 * 
  [0,17]   [0,16]   [0,08] 
TRADE -0,532   -0,641   -0,544 
  [0,30]   [0,45]   [0,19] 
MONET 0,195   1,009 **   0,930 
  [0,31]   [0,03]   [0,53] 
GOVERN -0,218 ** -0,265 *** 0,483 *** -0,175 *   
  [0,02] [0,00] [0,00] [0,08]   
FISCAL -0,006 0,556 -2,697 * -0,688 2,618 
  [0,98] [0,15] [0,06] [0,17] [0,64] 
PROP-R           
INVEST -0,243   -1,259 *   1,106 
  [0,34]   [0,06]   [0,51] 
FINANC 0,944 ***   -0,009   -9,251 ** 
  [0,00]   [0,98]   [0,03] 
CORRUPT 0,317   0,327   -1,87 
  [0,19]   [0,19]   [0,27] 
EDUC 2,824 *   -1,512     
  [0,09]   [0,59]     
GVT-EFF          
R2 within       
R2 between 
0,61           
0,60 
0,55    
0,60   
0,21           
0,87   
Signif. tests Hausman 0,00 Hausman 0,08 
Sargan: 0,05 
AB1: 0,01 
AB2: 0,22 
Hausman 0,43 
Sargan: 0,24  
AB1: 0,02 
AB2: 0,41 
No. of observ. 448 448 448 448 448 
No. of groups 14 years 14 years 14 years 32 countries 32 countries 
Panel data regression results for all 32 countries in period 1995-2008. P-values of statistical 
significance are in parentheses. ***, **, *  imply the significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. AB = Arellano-Bond tests for AR1 and AR2 in first differences.
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TABLE 4: Macroeconomic, institutional and risk drivers of FDI – Advanced-15 
  #5 #6 #7 #8 
Indicators  
(in logs) 
Cross-section 
specification 
Cross-section 
specification 
Time-series 
specification 
Time-series 
specification 
  Random effects Dynamic GMM Random effects Dynamic GMM 
(Intercept) 0,312 16,369 ** 0,164 11,73 
  [0,91] [0,02] [0,96] [0,56] 
GDP-PC    0,046 1,286 
     [0,94] [0,65] 
POPUL 1,265 *** 2,889 *** 1,302 *** 2,973 ** 
  [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,01] 
TRADE/GDP 1,254 * 8,742 *** 1,45 ** 8,881 *** 
  [0,06]  [0,00] [0,03] [0,01] 
TELEC         
L-COST        
REGUL -0,747 -1,529 -0,713 -0,428 
  [0,60] [0,46] [0,56] [0,92] 
TRADE        
MONET -0,159       
  [0,19]       
GOVERN -0,159 -0,46 -0,162 -0,299 
  [0,19] [0,11] [0,28] [0,66] 
FISCAL         
PROP-R -2,071 ** 9,494 *** -0,96 7,675 
  [0,05] [0,00] [0,20] [0,19] 
INVEST -0,858 -18,33 *** -1,004 -21,46 * 
  [0,25] [0,00] [0,33] [0,07] 
FINANC 0,593 -5,604 0,429 -6,25 
  [0,34] [0,16] [0,50] [0,21] 
CORRUPT 1,229 * 1,185 1,225   
  [0,05] [0,23] [0,16]   
EDUC        
GVT-EFF 1,864 ** -2,69 1,78 1,876 
  [0,03] [0,56] [0,21] [0,77] 
R2 within      
R2 between 
0,35           
0,03   
0,01           
0,91   
Signif. tests Hausman 0,23 
Sargan: 0,82 
AB1: 0,02    
AB2: 0,31 
Hausman 0,17 
Sargan: 0,14 
AB1: 0,02  
AB2: 0,61 
No. of observ. 210 210 210 210 
No. of groups 14 years 14 years 15 countries 15 countries 
Panel data regression results for 15 advanced European countries in 1995-2008. 
p-values of statistical significance are in parentheses. 
***, **, *  imply the significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
AB = Arellano-Bond tests for AR1 and AR2 in first differences. 
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TABLE 5: Macroeconomic, institutional and risk drivers of FDI - Accession-9 
 
Panel data regression results for nine accession countries in 1995-2008. 
p-values of statistical significance are in parentheses. 
***, **, *  imply the significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
AB = Arellano-Bond tests for AR1 and AR2 in first differences.
 #9 #10 # 11 #12 
Indicators 
(in logs) 
Cross-section 
specification 
Cross-section 
specification 
Time-series 
specification 
Time-series 
specification 
 Fixed   
effects 
Dynamic 
GMM 
Fixed    
effects 
Dynamic 
GMM 
(Intercept) -6,382 *** -19,85 *** -9,34 3,06 
 [0,00] [0,00] [0,19] [0,80] 
GDP-PC     
POPUL 0,936 *** 1,622 *** 0,896 0,858 *** 
 [0,00] [0,00] [0,34] [0,00] 
TRADE/GDP 0,002 -0,597 2,681 *** -0,500 
 [0,99] [0,52] [0,00] [0,33] 
TELEC     
L-COST     
REGUL 1,638 ** 3,281 ***   
 [0,02] [0,00]   
TRADE -0,641 1,295 1,007 10,08 *** 
 [0,41] [0,47] [0,21] [0,00] 
MONET 0,560 ** 0,229 0,592 ** -0,523 
 [0,04] [0,52] [0,04] [0,36] 
GOVERN -0,229 * -0,270 -0,491 *** -0,737 *** 
 [0,06] [0,19] [0,00] [0,00] 
FISCAL 1,441 ** 5,190 *** 1,34 -0,054 
 [0,02] [0,00] [0,11] [0,94] 
PROP-R 1,337 *** 0,097 0,729 0,756 
 [0,00] [0,86] [0,15] [0,65] 
INVEST -0,468 -0,795 * 0,415 -4,32 * 
 [0,19] [0,08] [0,34] [0,08] 
FINANC   0,293 2,19 * 
   [0,50] [0,06] 
CORRUPT   0,596 1,76 * 
   [0,12] [0,06] 
EDUC   -0,916 -5,28 
   [0,83] [0,42] 
GVT-EFF 1,304 ** 3,736 ***   
 [0,03] [0,00]   
R2 within     R2 
between 
0,79 
0,52 
              0,53            
0,47 
 
Signif. tests Hausman 0,00 Sargan: 0,08 
AB1: 0,01 
AB2: 0,31 
Hausman 0,00 Sargan: 0,25 
AB1: 0,03 
AB2: 0,48 
No. of observ. 126 126 126 126 
No. of groups 14 years 14 years 9 countries 9 countries 
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TABLE 6: Macroeconomic, institutional and risk drivers of FDI – Candidates-8 
  #13 #14 # 15 #16 
Indicators  
(in logs) 
Cross-section 
specification 
Cross-section 
specification 
Time-series 
specification 
Time-series 
specification 
  Fixed    effects Dynamic GMM Random effects Dynamic GMM 
(Intercept) -16,72 *** -17,47 *** -26,44 *** -47,8 *** 
  [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] 
GDP-PC       
POPUL 0,924 *** 0,984 *** 1,28 *** 2,137 *** 
  [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] 
TRADE/GDP 0,708 ** 3,023 *** 1,346 *** -0,124 
  [0,01] [0,00] [0,00] [0,96] 
TELEC         
L-COST   0,536 **     
    [0,03]     
REGUL 2,065 *** 6,308 *** 3,01 *** 10,62 *** 
  [0,00] [0,00] [0,01] [0,01] 
TRADE 0,492 0,837 0,47 -3,21 
  [0,51] [0,36] [0,52] [0,16] 
MONET 0,077 2,222 ** 0,311 0,623 
  [0,78] [0,03] [0,33] [052] 
GOVERN -0,218 0,376 -0,07 -0,661 
  [0,12] [0,20] [0,69] [0,14] 
FISCAL -0,146 -6,938 ** 0,916 1,66 
  [0,80] [0,05] [0,22] [0,64] 
PROP-R -0,417 * 0,187 -1,002 *** -2,24 ** 
  [0,07] [0,65] [0,00] [0,04] 
INVEST -0,491 ** -2,322 ** -0,668 * -2,35 ** 
  [0,05] [0,01] [0,06] [0,02] 
FINANC -0,295 -0,318     
  [0,27] [0,44]     
CORRUPT -0,163 -0,803 ** -0,25 0,206 
  [0,35] [0,03] [0,30] [0,47] 
EDUC 7,213 *** 6,209 ** 9,49 *** 20,25 *** 
  [0,00] [0,02] [0,00] [0,01] 
GVT-EFF 1,340 *** 1,169 ** 1,624 *** 0,663 
  [0,00] [0,04] [0,00] [0,10] 
R2 within      
R2 between 
0,84  
0,91   
0,77           
0,97   
Signif. tests Hausman 0,00 
Sargan: 0,42 
AB1: 0,02 
AB2: 0,27 
Hausman 0,34 
Sargan: 0,40 
AB1: 0,04 
AB2: 0,82 
No. of observ. 112 112 112 112 
No. of groups 14 years 14 years 8 countries 8 countries 
Panel data regression results for eight EU candidate countries in 1995-2008. 
p-values of statistical significance are in parentheses. 
***, **, *  imply the significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
AB = Arellano-Bond tests for AR1 and AR2 in first differences.  
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APPENDIX 2:  Tables 3 through 6 in an integrated overview:  Economic, institutional and risk drivers of FDI.  
Panel data regression results for all four groups of countries in 1995-2008. 
 
Note: The grey shading indicates significant results in the behaviour of agents, which are counter-intuitive due to their negative signs. 
Panel data regression results for 15 advanced European countries in 1995-2008. 
p-values of statistical significance are in parentheses. 
***, **, *  imply the significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
AB = Arellano-Bond tests for AR1 and AR2 in first differences. 
All All All All All Advanced Advanced Advanced Advanced Access. Access. Access. Access. Candid. Candid. Candid. Candid.
#1a #1b #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 # 11 #12 #13 #14 # 15 #16
Indicators   
(in logs)
Cross-section 
specification
Cross-section 
specification
Cross-section 
specification
Time-series 
specification
Time-series 
specification
Cross-section 
specification
Cross-section 
specification
Time-series 
specification
Time-series 
specification
Cross-section 
specification
Cross-section 
specification
Time-series 
specification
Time-series 
specification
Cross-section 
specification
Cross-section 
specification
Time-series 
specification
Time-series 
specification
Fixed    effects Random effects
Dynamic 
GMM
Random 
effects
Dynamic 
GMM
Random 
effects
Dynamic 
GMM
Random 
effects
Dynamic 
GMM Fixed   effects
Dynamic 
GMM Fixed    effects
Dynamic 
GMM Fixed    effects
Dynamic 
GMM
Random 
effects
Dynamic 
GMM
(Intercept) -8,409 ** -4,188 *** -0,341 -1,72 -119,7 0,312 16,369 ** 0,164 11,73 -6,382 *** -19,85 *** -9,34 3,06 -16,72 *** -17,47 *** -26,44 *** -47,8 ***
[0,01] [0,00] [0,95] [0,31] [0,20] [0,91] [0,02] [0,96] [0,56] [0,00] [0,00] [0,19] [0,80] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00]
GDP-PC 0 1,472 *** 0 0,778 ** 1,306 0 0 0,046 1,286 0,002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 [0,00] 0 [0,03] [0,54] 0 0 [0,94] [0,65] [0,99] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
POPUL 0,949 *** 0,847 *** 1,907 *** 0,789 *** 3,614 ** 1,265 *** 2,889 *** 1,302 *** 2,973 ** 0,936 *** 1,622 *** 0,896 0,858 *** 0,924 *** 0,984 *** 1,28 *** 2,137 ***
[0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,04] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,01] [0,00] [0,00] [0,34] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00]
TRADE/GDP 0,152 0 2,538 ** 0 0 1,254 * 8,742 *** 1,45 ** 8,881 *** 0,002 -0,597 2,681 *** -0,500 0,708 ** 3,023 *** 1,346 *** -0,124
[0,57] 0 [0,04] 0 0 [0,06] [0,00] [0,03] [0,01] [0,99] [0,52] [0,00] [0,33] [0,01] [0,00] [0,00] [0,96]
TELEC 0,636 *** 0 0,002 0,550 ** -0,162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0,00] 0 [0,99] [0,02] [0,91] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
L-COST 0,573 *** 0 0,810 *** 0,482 *** -0,599 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,536 ** 0 0
[0,00] 0 [0,00] [0,00] [0,60] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0,03] 0 0
REGUL 0,667 0 1,886 0 5,223 * -0,747 -1,529 -0,713 -0,428 1,638 ** 3,281 *** 0 0 2,065 *** 6,308 *** 3,01 *** 10,62 ***
[0,17] 0 [0,16] 0 [0,08] [0,60] [0,46] [0,56] [0,92] [0,02] [0,00] 0 0 [0,00] [0,00] [0,01] [0,01]
TRADE -0,532 0 -0,641 0 -0,544 0 0 0 0 -0,641 1,295 1,007 10,08 *** 0,492 0,837 0,47 -3,21
[0,30] 0 [0,45] 0 [0,19] 0 0 0 0 [0,41] [0,47] [0,21] [0,00] [0,51] [0,36] [0,52] [0,16]
MONET 0,195 0 1,009 ** 0 0,930 -0,159 0 0 0 0,560 ** 0,229 0,592 ** -0,523 0,077 2,222 ** 0,311 0,623
[0,31] 0 [0,03] 0 [0,53] [0,19] 0 0 0 [0,04] [0,52] [0,04] [0,36] [0,78] [0,03] [0,33] [052]
GOVERN -0,218 ** -0,265 *** 0,483 *** -0,175 * 0 -0,159 -0,46 -0,162 -0,299 -0,229 * -0,270 -0,491 *** -0,737 *** -0,218 0,376 -0,07 -0,661
[0,02] [0,00] [0,00] [0,08] 0 [0,19] [0,11] [0,28] [0,66] [0,06] [0,19] [0,00] [0,00] [0,12] [0,20] [0,69] [0,14]
FISCAL -0,006 0,556 -2,697 * -0,688 2,618 0 0 0 0 1,441 ** 5,190 *** 1,34 -0,054 -0,146 -6,938 ** 0,916 1,66
[0,98] [0,15] [0,06] [0,17] [0,64] 0 0 0 0 [0,02] [0,00] [0,11] [0,94] [0,80] [0,05] [0,22] [0,64]
PROP-R 0 0 0 0 0 -2,071 ** 9,494 *** -0,96 7,675 1,337 *** 0,097 0,729 0,756 -0,417 * 0,187 -1,002 *** -2,24 **
0 0 0 0 0 [0,05] [0,00] [0,20] [0,19] [0,00] [0,86] [0,15] [0,65] [0,07] [0,65] [0,00] [0,04]
INVEST -0,243 0 -1,259 * 0 1,106 -0,858 -18,33 *** -1,004 -21,46 * -0,468 -0,795 * 0,415 -4,32 * -0,491 ** -2,322 ** -0,668 * -2,35 **
[0,34] 0 [0,06] 0 [0,51] [0,25] [0,00] [0,33] [0,07] [0,19] [0,08] [0,34] [0,08] [0,05] [0,01] [0,06] [0,02]
FINANC 0,944 *** 0 -0,009 0 -9,251 ** 0,593 -5,604 0,429 -6,25 0 0 0,293 2,19 * -0,295 -0,318 0 0
[0,00] 0 [0,98] 0 [0,03] [0,34] [0,16] [0,50] [0,21] 0 0 [0,50] [0,06] [0,27] [0,44] 0 0
CORRUPT 0,317 0 0,327 0 -1,87 1,229 * 1,185 1,225 0 0 0 0,596 1,76 * -0,163 -0,803 ** -0,25 0,206
[0,19] 0 [0,19] 0 [0,27] [0,05] [0,23] [0,16] 0 0 0 [0,12] [0,06] [0,35] [0,03] [0,30] [0,47]
EDUC 2,824 * 0 -1,512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0,916 -5,28 7,213 *** 6,209 ** 9,49 *** 20,25 ***
[0,09] 0 [0,59] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0,83] [0,42] [0,00] [0,02] [0,00] [0,01]
GVT-EFF 0 0 0 0 0 1,864 ** -2,69 1,78 1,876 1,304 ** 3,736 *** 0 0 1,340 *** 1,169 ** 1,624 *** 0,663
0 0 0 0 0 [0,03] [0,56] [0,21] [0,77] [0,03] [0,00] 0 0 [0,00] [0,04] [0,00] [0,10]
R2 within        
R2 between
0,61               
0,60
0,55               
0,60 0
0,21             
0,87 0
0,35            
0,03 0
0,01            
0,91 0
0,79             
0,52 0
0,53            
0,47 0
0,84             
0,91 0
0,77            
0,97 0
Signif. tests Hausman 0,00 Hausman 0,08
Sargan: 0,05 
AB1:0,01 
AB2:0,22 Hausman 0,43
Sargan: 0,24  
AB1:0,02 
AB2:0,41 Hausman 0,23
Sargan: 0,82 
AB1: 0,02 
AB2: 0,31 Hausman 0,17
Sargan: 0,14 
AB1: 0,02 
AB2: 0,61 Hausman 0,00
Sargan: 0,08 
AB1: 0,01 
AB2: 0,31 Hausman 0,00
Sargan: 0,25 
AB1: 0,03 
AB2: 0,48 Hausman 0,00
Sargan:0,42 
AB1:0,02 
AB2:0,27
Hausman 
0,34
Sargan:0,40 
AB1:0,04 
AB2:0,82
No. of observ. 448 448 448 448 448 210 210 210 210 126 126 126 126 112 112 112 112
No. of groups 14 years 14 years 14 years 32 countries 32 countries 14 years 14 years 15 countries 15 countries 14 years 14 years 9 countries 9 countries 14 years 14 years 8 countries 8 countries
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